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ABSTRACT The Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) has been one of the most popular stream ciphers for providing
symmetric key encryption, and is now proposed as an efficient cipher within light-weight cryptography.
As an algorithm it has been considered to be one of the fastest stream ciphers and one of the easiest
to implement. Unfortunately, despite its simplicity of usage, a number of attacks on it have been found.
Therefore, various improvements of this algorithm exist in cryptography, but none of them use proper
randomness. This paper outlines modified version of RC4 and which has the desirable features of an efficient
stream cipher algorithm, and which integrates the Symmetric Random Function Generator (SRFG) method.
Though RC4 uses pseudorandom features with an initialisation vector and a seed value, the use of true
randomness in RC4 is novel in this domain. Therefore, this paper proposes a modified RC4 as MRC4,
and which then evaluates the statistical features of MRC4 based upon parameters such as non-linearity,
resiliency, balancedness, propagation and immunity. Further, we have compared the security features and
confusion-diffusion attributes with some recent variants of RC4 and have found that MRC4 is efficient in
withstanding against attacks. The experimental results show that MRC4 supports a 60% better confusion
property and 50% better diffusion as compared to the original RC4 method.
INDEX TERMS RC4, Random Number, Security, Cipher
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography provides a fundamental security layer for data
and secure services [1]. With the rise of IoT, we need im-
proved cryptographic algorithms which are efficient in terms
of security and computational complexity [2] [3] [4]. Design-
ing such algorithms thus requires a number of considerations,
such as key size, message size, functionality, and random-
ness. A key management system includes its selection, usage
and background algorithm as one of the critical factors in
cryptography. A weak key, or the weak algorithm with a
strong key, can cause an exploitation of the ciphertext, and
thus reveal the plaintext.
Along with the development of the ciphers, cryptanalysis
is attractive to cryptography designers as it can identify
vulnerabilities in the ciphers for further improvement. The
structural design of cryptography algorithms and their cor-
responding technical functions are thus important considera-
tions [5]. Logic gates including AND, OR, NOT, XOR, and
XNOR are used often in the cryptographic functions of the
algorithms. All these functions are good enough of develop-
ing any cryptographic algorithm, but as per the present need
of randomness features, they often lag behind in exhibiting
this randomness in their data processing. Moreover, functions
used in cryptography possess some important features like
balancedness, non-linearity, resiliency, immunity, correlation
and propagation which are to be considered for evaluating the
strength of the ciphers and not been evaluated significantly
while designing the stream ciphers like RC4. In this paper,
we have considered such parameters for RC4 in the inte-
gration of functional randomness. The cryptographic feature
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analysis and the inclusion of true randomness are the major
contributions in this paper. For this the paper outlines a
key scheduling module for MRC4 and which supports a
key scheduling modification using the Symmetric Random
Function Generator (SRFG) method [6].
Section II briefly explains the basic functioning of the orig-
inal RC4 algorithm and summarizes the various attacks on
the algorithm. Section III shows the proposed modification in
RC4 and explains its cryptographic and randomness features.
Section IV covers a security analysis of MRC4 and Section
V compares the performance results. Section VI finished with
the core conclusions of the work.
II. THE RC4 METHOD
RC4 is a popular and widely accepted stream cipher designed
in 1987 by Ron Rivest [1]. Within light-weight cryptography,
such with embedded devices, RC4 is still seen to be a power-
ful stream cipher, especially in terms of its memory footprint,
its flexible key size, its energy consumption, and its CPU
utilization [29] [30]. Overall, it uses a key-size with variable
length and applies byte-oriented operations with random
permutation in order to create a pseudorandom stream. The
security base of the algorithm depends on a pseudorandom
key scheduling process, with a variable key length of between
one to 256 bytes (8 bits to 2,048 bits). This is used to initialize
the state vector S. For each encryption/decryption, a byte
k is generated that works as a keystream part. This byte is
generated by a systematic method from S. Finally, as with
most stream ciphers, an XOR operation is used between the
plaintext byte and the k byte. The algorithm of the original
RC4, and its key scheduling, are illustrated in Figure 1.
The RC4 stream cipher has been used extensively within
network protocols such as SSL, WEP, TLS, and WPA.
Though this algorithm has been used widely, RC4 always has
faced cryptanalysis attacks due to its several drawbacks [7],
and which has reduced its adoption. Within WEP, the size of
the original key in RC4 was limited to 40 bits, and which used
a 24-bit Initialization Vector (IV). The small size of the key
made it vulnerable to brute force attack, and the small size
of the IV caused the same IV value to be rolled-over after
a relatively short time. When this roll-over happened, it was
then possible to reveal the plaintext [31].
In [8], the authors defined a family of related keys for each
2048-bit key, and which differs in one of the byte positions.
The keystream generated by RC4 for a key and its related
keys are substantially similar. Therefore, it is relatively easy
to use a statistical analysis or linear and differential crypt-
analysis to achieve the secret key. A statistical analysis of
the RC4 keystream generator is also shown in [9], and where
their process uses only 230.6 bytes of its outputs and also
analyses the distinguisher of 8-bit randomness. Researchers
have also identified a number of weak keys against RC4 and
which signifies that RC4 is no longer accepted for security
processes [10]. Weak keys are used to generate the distin-
guisher for RC4 and to execute a related key attack on the
cipher. It is also shown that a proposed passive ciphertext
attack procedure can break any arbitrary long key within
practical time complexities. The authors also analysed the
Fortuitous states in RC4.
A statistical bias has been identified in the distribution of
the first two output bytes of the RC4 keystream generator
[11]. This work shows that 225 bytes of outputs are sufficient
to effectively measure the RC4 outputs from random strings.
A cryptanalytic attack that uses the tree representation of
RC4 cipher is also analysed [12]. It introduces an abstraction
for managing the information about its internal state. A hill-
climbing strategy is then used to find out the initial state. The
simple complexity of this attack as compared to exhaustive
search confirms that RC4 is weak. This attack is derived from
a class of table-shuffling ciphers, and where the table entries
are permuted by next-state function.
In [13], the authors present a generalizes framework for
differential cryptanalysis on RC4. The differences in the key,
or in the keystream patterns, are then used to analyse the bit
vectors of the internal state of the cipher and in retrieving
that bit sequence. In [14], the authors analyse the permutation
operations which are considered to be non-linear. The theo-
retical analysis of the work shows that permutation bytes in
any stage in key scheduling algorithm of RC4 are biased, and
that this bias reveals the secret key eventually. The colliding
key problem in RC4 has been described in [15]. These keys
disrupt the pseudorandomness and are able to calculate the
same initial state, and which eventually outputs the same
pseudorandom byte stream. A new state transition sequence
of the key scheduling algorithm is shown which is used with
a related key pair of an arbitrary fixed length, thus leading to
key collision problems. Another key collision work on RC4
has been researched in [16], and attack on RC4 (n,m) has
been shown in [17]. The authors show two attacks: one is
based on non-randomness of internal state, and which allows
it to be distinguishes from a truly random cipher. Another
attack is depending upon low diffusion of bits in the key
scheduling of RSA and PRGA algorithms, and recovers all
the bytes of the secret key. Empirical correlations among
the keystream bytes and the secret key have been studied
thoroughly in [18], and which show that the non-randomness
behaviour of RC4 works as a bias and exhibits such relations
which are used for cryptanalysis attacks.
A number of improvements to RC4 have been suggested
by different researchers. An improved RC4 has been shown
in [19] and which uses a new pseudorandom bit generator
with two secret keys and three pointers. The key size con-
dition for robustness in RC4 has been analysed in the paper
[20], and a analysis of modified RC4 following the same use
of two keys has been shown in [21]. Three enhanced variants
of RC4 have been proposed in [22], and where the authors
concentrate on the pseudorandom number generation, rather
than the key scheduling. A hybrid chaotic-based approach
has been used in [23] for improving the strength of RC4. In
[24], the initial state factorial is used to solve the correlation
issue of RC4, and an additional state table is used to remove
the correlation between publicly known outputs of the inter-
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FIGURE 1: Working principle of RC4
nal state. The same length as that of the state has been used
for this table to contain the factorial of initial state elements.
The analysis of the previous work signifies that RC4
suffers from cryptanalysis attacks due mainly to its keystream
biasness. Moreover, the collision of keys and the distin-
guisher generation also create major drawback in this cipher.
To mitigate these, we propose the usage of SRFG [6] so that
randomness can be strictly provided in key scheduling and no
keystream byte can be backtracked to the secret key.
III. MODIFIED RC4 (MRC4) AND ITS FEATURES
The analysis of the literature review exhibits the fact the RC4
faces the cryptanalysis problems due to its key scheduling
algorithm. Thus we have modified the first stage of RC4
key scheduling. and where we added SRFG to each byte
transferred from K to T. For this, SRFG will get two inputs
from two consecutive bytes of K. The bytes in K is considered
to be iterative until the completion of bytes of T. For the last
byte of T to be generated, the last byte of K (after expanding)
and the first byte K is considered as inputs of SRFG. At this
time, we have stored the keystream accordingly to bytes for
decryption process. The modification has been summarized
in Algorithm 1. All the others modules are kept the same and
therefore only the modified process is shown in Figure 2.
We have experimented the key scheduling algorithm
(KSA) of RC4 with our previously developed SRFG [6]. It
removes the biasness from the keystream bytes. This bias
generates cryptanalysis attacks deducing linear or differential
relations among the states or keystream bytes and backtracks
the secret key. We have explained the important features of
the outputs of KSA in MRC4 such as: balancedness; non-
linearity; resiliency; propagation criterion; and immunity by
applying the SRFG. Each byte bi in the initial state space T
′
Algorithm 1
1: procedure ALGORITHM-1
2: for i = 0 to 255 do
3: if (keylen == 256) then
4: for j = 0 to 255
5: T ′[j] = k[i]
6: end loop
7: else
8: for j = 0 to keylen
9: recursively copy k[j] to T [i]
10: end loop
11: end if
12: end loop
13: for i = 0 to 255 do
14: T [i] = T ′[i]⊗T ′[i+1] where⊗represents SRFG
15: end loop
16: T [255] = T ′[255] ⊗ T ′[0]
17: end procedure
is comprised of 8 bits and is considered as 8-bit byte vector b
in our experimentation.
Consider F2 as the set of all the functions on two
variables input to the SRFG stage in generation of T
where all the functions mapping from F 22 into F2 providing
F 22 = { (b1, b2)| bi ∈ F2}. F2 is considered as the finite field
of two elements {0,1} and ⊕ is any operation on the field
F2.
Any combined function fc ∈ F2 of five terms (in this
proposed work, we have taken the expression length as 5)
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FIGURE 2: The proposed modification in RC4 scheme
is expressed as a polynomial and given as:
fc (b1, b2) = ⊕λu
(
2∏
i=1
rand (bi)
ui
)5
, λu ∈ F2 , u ∈ F 22
(1)
with,
λu = ⊕fc(b), b 4 u,∀ bi = {bi1 , bi2 , . . . ., bi8 } (2)
where,
(bi1 , bi2 , . . . , bi8) 4 (u1, u2, . . . , u8) iff
∀i, j , wij ≤ ui and j = 1, 2, .., 8
(3)
The output of fc depends on the weight of its in-
put variables. As a result, fc corresponds to a function
hc: {0, , 1, . . . ,8}→ F2 such that ∀x ∈ F 22 , fc (x) = hc (wt (x)) .
The sequence hc (fc) = (hc (0) , hc(1) . . . ,hc (7) ) is also an
8-bit byte vector and considered as simplified value vector of
fc. The established relation between simplified value vector
and Arithmetic Normal Form (ANF), can be shown as:
fc (b1, b2) = ⊕λf (j) ⊕
(
2∏
i=1
rand (bi)
ui
)5
= ⊕ λf (j) Xj,N
(4)
where, λf (j) , u ∈ F 22 and L∈ Z, j={1, 2} . Xj,N is the
two variable elementary polynomial of degree j. The co-
efficients of ANF of fc is represented by 8−bit vector,
λ (fc) ={ λf (0) , λf (1) , . . . ., λf (8)}. The functional
and mathematical properties of KSA in MRC4 have been
shown in following subsections.
A. BALANCEDNESS
The balanced property in the proposed KSA in MRC4 exists
if its simplified value vector hc satisfies the following condi-
tion:
∀ i = {1, 2} , hc (i) = hc (2− i)  1 ,
where  is sum over F2
(5)
Inheriting the trivial balancedness feature from SRFG in
KSA fc verifies the condition D1fc= 1 which actually does
not exist for even values of n (here n =8 for bytes). For any
byte vector b, wt (b) =n/2 (where, wt (b) is the weight of
byte vector defined as number of 1s in it), we can calculate
the D1fc as:
D1fc= fc (b)  fc (b+1)= hc (
n
2
)  hc
(n
2
)
= 0 (6)
As each byte is balanced, the overall bytes in initial
states are also balanced. Therefore, this balancedness prop-
erty helps to prevent attacks depending upon the weight or
Hamming distances [25].
B. NONLINEARITY
The nonlinearity is calculated by the Hamming distance
between two affine transformations. For example, two-byte
vectors are: bi and bj of 8 bits each:
N ` (bik , bjk) =
n∑
k=1
bik 6= bjk , where n= 8 (7)
This property of non-linearity removes the probability of bias
and reduces the chances of deducing relations with all 0s or
all 1s inputs. Each byte follows this non-linearity to generate
the initial state of T .
C. RESILIENCY
The proposed KSA in MRC4 is m-resilient if the output
remains balanced when any m input bits are fixed and re-
maining (8-m) bits are altered in next sequence. The function
is more resilient if m is higher. The property of resiliency is
related to the weights of the restrictions of the fc to some
subspaces.
∀ fc ∈ F2 and any affine subspace S ⊂ F 22 , the restriction
of fc to S is the function given as:
fS : S → F2 (8)
The subspace S is spanned by k canonical basis vectors
and its supplementary subspace is S. The restrictions of fc to
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S and to all its cosets are given by b′ + S where, b′ ∈ S .
Being fc symmetric and balanced, S is represented as: S =
〈s1, s2, . . . , sk〉 and fa+ S becomes symmetric and balanced
too. Moreover, for all s ∈ S, we can write the following:
fb′+ S (s) = f (b′ + s) = hc (wt (b′) + wt (s)) (9)
The simplified value vector and the simplified ANF vector of
fa+ S can be deduced from fc as given below.
hcfb′+ S (i) = hc (i+ wt (b
′)) , ∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ k (10)
λfb′+ S (i) = ⊕ λf (i+ j) , ∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ k and j 4 wt(b′)
(11)
Proposition 1: For the proposed KSA in MRC4 with m-
resiliency factor, two consecutive keystream bytes with 8
bits each have maximum non-linearity of 5. In such cases,
the difference between simplified value vectors of the two
consecutive bytes of T equals to the sum of the non-linearity
of two consecutive bytes bi,bj, in T.
max[N ` (bi , bi+1)] → 5 (12)
[ hcKSA (Tk)− hcKSA (Tk+1)] =
255∑
i,j=0
N ` (bi , bj)
(13)
D. PROPAGATION CRITERION
Following the basic properties of SRFG as shown in our
previous work [6], the proposed KSA satisfies the propa-
gation criterion of degree k and order m as the outputs of
KSA are represented by affine functions keepingm input bits
constant and satisfies the propagation criterion of degree k.
Considering each keystream byte for experimentation.
Let fc ∈ F2 and let bi, bj ∈ F 22 , ∀ i, j = 1, 2, .., 256
, such that wt (bi) =wt (bj) =n2 . Then, Dbifc and Dbjfc
are linearly equivalent. This signifies that if we change the
input variables with a linear permutation µ of F 22 , such that
Dbifc = Dbjfc ◦ µ, where ◦ is composite function.
The permutation µ exists on the variable in a way so that
bj = µ(bi). Since, fc used in KSA is symmetric and
balanced, we can have,
Dbjfc (µ (a)) = Dbifc (a) , where a ∈ S (14)
Let k be an integer, 1 ≤k ≤n−1, z∈ bi=
〈
bi1 , bi2 , ..., bin−k
〉
and εk= bn−k+1+ · · ·+wn . Then for any z = a+ bj , with
a ∈ S , then we can have the following.
wt (z) =wt (a) +wt (bj) (15)
wt (z+ εk) =wt (a) +wt (bj+ εk) =wt (a) +k−wt(bj)
(16)
Thus,∀ a∈B, B = {b0, bi . . . ., b255}
Dεkfc (a+y) =fc (a+b)  fc (a+εk+bj)
=wt (a) +wt (bj+ εk) =wt (a) +k−wt (bj)
=hc (wt (a) +w (bj)) (wt (a) +k−w (bj))
(17)
Equation 17 signifies that hc follows the symmetric prop-
erty. This means that partial derivatives of our proposed KSA
outputs are also propagated with the propagation features.
E. IMMUNITY
Correlation immunity and algebraic immunity are examined
for the proposed KSA in MRC4. For correlation immunity,
considering each of the two input bytes bi as a 8-bit binary
vector the outputs are correlation immune if:
Prob ( fc= bi) =
1
2
, 1≤i ≤8 (18)
The probability distribution must be equal for all the bits
and therefore, the output byte bo ∈T , having the following
property.
|min[M0 (bo, ( bo)r)−M1 (bo, ( bo)r) ]| = min[m] 7→0
(19)
where, [M0 (bo, ( bo)
r
)] is the matching of output bytes
from KSA and its reverse with respect to value 0 and
[M1 (bo, ( bo)
r
)] is the matching of output words from KSA
and its reverse with respect to value 1.
Following the above property, an interesting feature of our
proposed key expansion module has been identified and the
proposition has been given as:
Proposition 2: In MRC4, if [M0 (bo, ( bo)
r
)] = m0 and
[M1 (wo, ( wo)
r
)] = m1 , then the maximum non-linearity
between two successive Tk will be the sum of all m0 and m1
for all the bo in T.
max [N ` (Ti , Ti+1 )] =
256∑
1
m0 +m1, for all bo in T
Algebraic immunity is related with the annihilator of a
function. To evaluate this property for the proposed KSA we
have considered the following. Given, fc ∈ F2, any function
of the set A (fc) = { g ∈ F2 | gf= 0 } is defined as the
annihilator of the function fc . The algebraic immunity of fc
is denoted by AI (fc) is the minimum degree of all nonzero
annihilators of fc or fc +1. The value ofAI (fc) is given as:
AI (fc) =min [deg (g) ] | g 6=0, g ∈A (fc) ∪ A (fc+1)
(20)
As we have used SRFG to generate the output bytes,
the minimum degree is always n2 . Therefore, the algebraic
immunity of the outputs from it is always n2 which is always
optimal.
We can rewrite the equation 20 for two consecutive state of
T as:
AI (fc) =min [deg (Ti)] | fc → Tig 6=0,
A (fc) ∪ A (fc+1) 6= 0
` AI (fc)−AI (fc+1) = 0
(21)
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The analysis of the previous works on RC4 in Section II
shows that the cipher suffers from the problem of biased
distinguisher and which eventually deduces the relational
statistics for identifying the secret key. The biasedness is
generated with all the binary zero or all the binary one values
of bytes of inputs. Moreover, related key attacks are also
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responsible for linear and differential cryptanalysis on RC4.
Therefore, in the following subsections we have analysed the
security features of MRC4 in the above said perspective.
A. RELATED KEY ATTACK ANALYSIS
We focus on how the S-box initialization responds to a
single-byte difference in its input. Assume any random key
k
′
(i) = k(i) where, k(i) is the original key except when
i = t where k(t) 6= k′(t). In this case, j = ( j +
S(i) + k(i)) mod 256 will result in different values of j.
If t is close to zero, the resulting S-boxes will be completely
different. If t is close to 255, however, the S-boxes will be
substantially similar because the first t- 1 iterations through
the initialization loop have performed exactly the same work.
We have used a twiddled key k
′
(t) = k(t) + µ and therefore
k
′
(t+1) = k(t+1)−µ, the value of j at ith iteration will be
j′i = ji + µ and j
′
i+1 will be same as ji. This k’ and k are
called related keys. With this key-setup, in the initialization
phase, the RC4 output for the original key and the related
key will proceed in lock step for b′i = bi still s′i−1 6= si−1.
At this point we define it as derailment of RC4 systems and
identical bytes produced by the two keys is defined as the
length of the derailment.
In our experiment, for two randomly chosen keys - in the
initialization phase of the KSA - the probability of two bytes
to be similar is given as:
P (b
′
i = bi) =
255∑
i=0
⊕ 5∏
4
P (b
′
i)× P (bi)
= 256 × 1
3125
× 1
256
× 1
256
= 0.00000125
(22a)
To generalize the above equation for any x bytes of key, the
above equation can be re-written as:
P (b
′
i = bi) =
i=x−1∑
i=0
⊕ 5∏
4
P (b
′
i)× P (bi) (22b)
The probability of the derailment length of d is calculated
as:
P (d) = P (b
′
i = bi)
d → 0 due to its least value (23)
The derailment of RC4 is related to the distinguishing
attack. A distinguisher is an algorithm which distinguishes
a stream of bytes from a perfectly random byte stream. It
verifies whether a stream of bytes that has been chosen is
according to the uniform distribution. Cryptanalysts try to
distinguish between a string generated by an insecure pseu-
dorandom byte generator and one from a perfectly random
source. There are different types of distinguishers used by the
adversaries as: regular; prefix; and hybrid. In all the cases,
the main objective is to identify a two-byte sequence to be
same, in order to observe a higher derailment length. But,
in our experimentation, we have found that the probability
of two bytes getting similar is too small and therefore the
distinguishing attack cannot be inferred.
B. LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS
We have followed the bit-advantage concept for analysis of
linear attacks. If an attack is executed on an n-bit key and
recovers the correct value of the key ranked among the top
m out of 2n possible candidates, the attack obtains an (n
- log (m)) -bit advantage over exhaustive search. In such
attacks, linear equations are made from the known plaintexts
functioning with the ciphertext to get the key bytes. Linear
cryptanalysis is common in RC4 as the key bytes are directly
XORed with plaintext bytes and key bytes are achievable.
But, in MRC4 we have processed KSA with SRFG so that
for any two random bytes of keystream, the total key is not
going to be deduced. Therefore, we have analysed the linear
relation approximation on two related keys rather than on
known plaintexts as below.
Following Theorem 2 in the research work [26], if Ps is the
probability that a linear attack on an n-bit keystream byte (8
bits here) - with a linear approximation of probability p and
with N known related keystream bytes - delivers an m-bit or
higher advantage. Assuming that the linear approximation’s
probability to hold is independent for each key tried and is
equal to 12 for all wrong keys, we can have:
Ps = p
N (n−m) (1− 2m−1) (24)
Now, to calculate the linear approximation of probability p
of the attack we have evaluated that whether any two wrong
keys k1 and k2 are deriving two similar bytes or not. The
probability of such similarity has been calculated in Equation
25. This shows that the success probability Ps is also reduced
and approximates to 0 if m→ n.
Ps = p
N (n−m) (1− 2m−1)
= (≈ 0)N (n− n) (1− 2n−1) = 0 (25)
Therefore the proposition can be written as:
Proposition 3: In MRC4, if P (b
′
i = bi) → 0 and
n-bit random keystream byte attempts to generate an n-bit
advantage, the success probability Ps = 0.
C. DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS
We concentrate on keys of 256 bits as these keys are very
common in wireless implementations. The differential crypt-
analysis deduces the output streams that are expected to be
the same in the first few bytes even though input has been
changed. Generally, this cryptanalysis is a type of chosen
plaintext. Therefore, we need to check the probability of
getting any two similar cipher text bytes for two chosen
plaintext bytes.
Let pt
′
and pt′′ are two chosen plaintext of l bytes with a
known difference MRC4 and given as:
pt
′ − pt′′ = N `( pt′ , pt′′) (26)
Due to the convenience of calculation, we assume that the
non-linearity is uniformly distributed among all the bytes of
the chosen plaintexts and therefore, from Equation 27 we can
write the following:
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TABLE 1: S-box information
Algorithm name P (b
′
i = bi) Active S-boxes
Original RC4 0.564 after 50% of the 256states of repetition 128
Werrasinghe [21] 0.33 after 60% of the 256states of repetition 144
RC4-M3 [22] 0.27 after 70% of the 256states of repetition 128
RC4-A [32] 0.15 190
VMPC [33] 0.23 200
RC4+ [34] 0.31 128
Proposed MRC4 ≈ 0 256
N` ( pt
′
i, pt
′′
i) =
N `( pt′ , pt′′ )
l = ∆i,
for i = 0, 1, 2, .., l − 1
Following the Equation 22b, the probability of any two
ciphertext bytes to be similar can be calculated as:
P (ct
′
i = ct
′′
i) =
1
l!
2! ×(l−2)!
× P (b′ i = bi)× 1
∆i
(27a)
Assuming a key size of 256 bits (32 bytes) and plaintext
size of 64 bytes, we can write from the above equation is:
P (ct
′
i = ct
′′
i)
=
1
l!
2! ×(l−2)!
× P (b′ i = bi)× 1
∆i
=
1
2016
× 32 × 1
3125
× 1
32
× 1
32
× 1
∆i
= 5 × 10−9 × 1
∆i
(27b)
The above equation shows that using the two chosen
plaintext, the probability of two random similar cipher bytes
is impractical. Therefore, differential analysis is not possible
on our MRC4. From, this analysis, we can infer the following
proposition.
Proposition 4: In MRC4, the probability of the two similar
ciphertext bytes is inversely proportional to the number of
plaintext bytes and inversely proportional to non-linearity
and given as:
P (ct
′
i = ct
′′
i) ∝ 1
∆i
(28a)
P (ct
′
i = ct
′′
i) ∝ 1
l
(28b)
From the above, we can write:
P (ct
′
i = ct
′′
i) ∝ 1
∆i × l ` P (ct
′
i = ct
′′
i)
= k × 1
∆i × l , where k is constant and given as k
= P (b
′
i = bi) = 0.125× 10−4
(29)
S-box information maps the non-zero inputs to any non-zero
outputs in the array. For the RC4 with 256 bits, 256 states are
defined. Using the SRFG the randomization for temporary
state generation T
′
also obtains the randomized bits for every
iteration with P (b
′
i = bi) measured very small. We have
compared some of the RC4 versions for the process and
measured the active S-boxes in multiple iterations shown in
Table 1.
D. NON-RELATED KEY ATTACKS
In this attack environment, the same data is encrypted several
times using the same key, but using a different Initial Value
(IV). This is referred to as the standard (non-related-key)
model, where the IV value is presumed to be under control
of the attacker.
A plaintext pt is encrypted several times using different
initial values V1, V2, .., Vn which are biased and under control
of attacker. Assuming the length of the initial values Vi are
of b bits, and probability of derailment rail identification is
approximately zero, the probability of two ciphertexts to be
similar can be derived as an extension of linear cryptanalysis
and relate key analysis. It is calculated as:
P (ct
′
= ct
′′
) = P (d)× P (b′i = bi)→ 0 (30)
As P (d) → 0 and P (b′i = bi) is small enough for large
number of bits sequence, the overall probability of the two
ciphertexts to be same also near to zero which signifies that
the non-related key attacks are also resistible by the presented
MRC4.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have implemented the proposed MRC4 in software with
hardware specification as: CPU: 2.6 GHz, i3 6th Gen with
4 GB RAM. MRC4 is developed with Python using cryp-
tographic libraries. The output results are analyzed using
R programming and NIST statistical suite. We have com-
pared our experimental results with the original RC4, four
extended versions of RC4 [22] [32] [33] [34] and two recent
improvements of RC4 [21] [35]. We have stored the key
bytes generated from the keystream generator and we shall
consider this as a feature work to deal with key storage
process. Note that, only the keystream generation process
is only modified in MRC4; however, we have measured the
results with the overall process of encryption and decryption.
We have varied the key sizes from 64 bits to 2,048 bits in all
the performance metrics.
The first comparison is done on the basis features extracted
in Section III: non-linearity, balancedness, resiliency, propa-
gation criterion, correlation immunity and algebraic immu-
nity. We have measured the order of the features stated above
and compared accordingly as in Table 2. The comparison
results in Table 2 signifies that our proposed modification
of keystream generation is efficient in terms of the above
said features. We can see from the table that the original
RC4 method was lagging behind in acquiring the important
features of cryptographic functions and therefore, the attacks
as considered in the previous work are executable on this
cipher. Better results are noticed in improvement proposed
in [21] as compared to original RC4, but still it is not enough
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TABLE 2: Comparison of Features
Order
of Non-
linearity
Order of
Balanced-
ness
Order of
Resiliency
Order of
Propagation
criterion
Order of
Correlation
immunity
Order of
Algebraic
immunity
Original RC4 n
10
0 0 0 n
10
0
Weerasinghe [21] n
6
0 0 0 n
4
0
RC4-M3 [22] n
4
0 log2n
log2n
n
n n
8
RC4-A [32] n
6
0 0 log2
n
3
n
8
n
8
VMPC [33] n
6
0 0 log2
n
2
n
10
n
8
RC4+ [34] n
4
0 log2n
log2n
n
n
8
n
4
Jindal et al. [35] n
8
0 log2
n
2
log2n
n
n
4
n
10
Proposed MRC4 n
3
n
2
n
2
− 2 log2n n n2
n is the value of bits in cipher text considering all the bits, orders are
calculated based upon maximum degree
for the purpose. Furthermore, the improvement shown in [22]
and the other versions of RC4 modifications as in [32] [33]
[34] [35] show far better results as compared to the previous
two algorithms and possess some cryptographic attributes.
However, the use of SRFG in the proposed modification
has provided improved features and the optimality of bal-
ancedness which is useful for preventing bitsum attacks [25].
The high correlation immunity in the proposed MRC4 is
advantageous to prevent correlation attacks [27].
We have compared the computation time for all the al-
gorithms as stated above on the same platform. In this
comparison too, we have assumed the time for XORing
operation is a constant for both encryption and decryption
and therefore not considered in the time consumption cal-
culation. Therefore, Table 3 only compares the time taken
(in microseconds) for the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA)
by varying the key size. The time comparison results show
that use of the SRFG in RC4 key scheduling modification is
increasing the time consumption in generating the keystream
bytes and thus contributing to the trade-off between security
and time consumption. The same has also been addressed by
the authors in [22]. To support this trade-off and overcome
with the security issues, we have also compared the attacks
on the algorithms in terms of cost of bits as shown in Table
4. For this comparison, we have considered 50 plaintexts of
128 bytes each with 128-bit (16-byte) keys. Table 4 describes
the fact that the cost of the attacks for our proposed MRC4
is much higher than the other algorithms due to the use of
randomness with SRFG in KSA. This signifies that MRC4 is
better in terms of security.
The time comparison results show that use of the SRFG
in RC4 key scheduling modification is increasing the time
consumption in generating the keystream bytes and thus
contributing to the trade-off between security and time con-
sumption. The same has also been addressed by the authors
in [22]. To support this trade-off and overcome with the
security issues, we have also compared the attacks on the
algorithms in terms of cost of bits as shown in Table 4. For
this comparison, we have considered 50 plaintexts of 128
bytes each with 128-bit (16-byte) keys.
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FIGURE 3: Confusion index comparison
Table 4 describes the fact that the cost of the attacks for our
proposed MRC4 is much higher than the other algorithms due
to the use of randomness with SRFG in KSA. This signifies
that MRC4 is better in terms of security.
Lastly, we have compared two prime evaluation param-
eters of cryptographic algorithms: confusion and diffusion.
According to ShannonâA˘Z´s theory [28], confusion property
exhibits the statistical relationship of between the ciphertext
and key to be more complex whereas, diffusion property
yields the relationship between plaintext and ciphertext such
that a single bit change in plaintext must change at least half
of the cipher text bits. We have introduced two new metrics,
Confusion Index (CI) and Diffusion Index (DI) in this point
to have a bounded range of the metric and given as:
CI =
key bits × nonlinearity in two ciphertext
ciphertext bits
DI =
nonlinearity in two ciphertext
plaintext bits
(31)
The maximum value of the confusion index in Equation 31
can be∝which is not possible in the real-life implementation
scenarios as all the cipher text bits cannot be changed for a
single bit change in key. If it happens then, it will work as
a bias in next state initialization. We have varied the key bits
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TABLE 3: Time Consumption of KSA
Hardware specification for computation: CPU: 2.6 GHz, i3 6th Gen
with 4 GB RAM
Scheme Key size
64 bit 128 bit 256 bit 512 bit 1024 bit 2048 bit
Original RC4 20.32 18.39 17.58 17.23 16.42 16.13
Weerasinghe [21] 25.35 20.15 19.7 18.71 17.45 16.57
RC4-M3 [22] 44.42 43.73 43.09 42.66 40.78 40.32
RC4-A [32] 43.90 41.25 39.87 38.66 37.50 33.87
VMPC [33] 45.88 45.01 43.20 42.87 41.67 41.50
RC4+ [34] 40.90 39.25 37.87 36.67 35.50 33.87
Jindal et al. [35] 38.82 37.37 36.87 35.50 34.33 33.67
Proposed MRC4 43.47 42.83 41.16 40.27 39.50 39.20
TABLE 4: Comparison of cost of attacks
Differential
cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanaly-
sis
Related key at-
tacks
Original RC4 2128 264 2128
Weerasinghe [21] 2128 2128 2128
RC4-M3 [22] 2512 2128 2512
RC4-A [32] 2178 2512 2512
VMPC [33] 2712 2430 2512
RC4+ [34] 2908 2512 2624
Jindal et al. [35] 2512 2128 2228
Proposed MRC4 21024 21024 23125
from 64 to 2048 with a fixed plaintext of 128 bytes (1024 bits)
and, as an output, we have received 128 bytes (1024bits).
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FIGURE 4: Diffusion index comparison
The results are compared with other algorithms as well and
shown in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. From Figure 3, we can
observe the proposed MRC4 is best in providing confusion
as compared to others. Jindal et. al. [35] shows an increasing
confusion index but drops down after 1024 bits of keysize.
The other algorithms are show significantly low confusion
index which is not suitable for stream ciphers. Moreover,
an interesting behaviour of MRC4 has been observed here.
It shows that up to 128-bit keys, the confusion index is
almost static and with the key size of 256 bits to 512 bits
it increases with a high slope and with higher than 512 bits of
keys, confusion index decreases rapidly. This fact signifies
that for MRC4 using the key sizes in between of 256 to
512 bits is most efficient. Similarly, Figure 4 shows that
original RC4 and the algorithm shown in reference [21] are
having very low diffusion property. The algorithm in [22] is
having a better diffusion index whereas the modification in
RC4 shown in [35] provides good diffusion till near about
512 bits and then degrades the performance with increasing
keysize. The other algorithms are having average diffusion
but less than that of the our proposed MRC4. Like confusion,
here also MRC4 follows a constant diffusion index up to
the key size of 256 bits but drastically changes with the
use of 512 bits of keys and gets constant after with higher
bits of keys. Analysing the behaviour of MRC4 in confusion
and diffusion, we can say that the use of 512 bits key is
considered to be the most efficient use in MRC4 to get high
cryptographic features.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
RC4 has been a popular stream cipher but has been iden-
tified with a number of cryptographic weaknesses. It is,
though, well matched to light-weight cryptography methods.
This paper outlines a solution related to the randomness
in key scheduling algorithm of RC4 and uses SRFG. The
experimental results show that MRC4 possess a 60% better
confusion property and 50% better diffusion as compared
to the original RC4 method. The limitation of this paper is
about the time taken by the KSA as compared to the state-
of-the-art. Therefore, it is confirmed that RC4 is able to
provide good security features at the cost of increased time,
and which leads to a trade-off between security and time.
Ignoring the fact of the time consumption if we consider only
the robustness and security features. MRC4 is efficient in all
respects of cryptographic attributes and security evaluation.
Furthermore, being a symmetric keystream cipher, RC4 uses
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the single key for both encryption and decryption. In this pa-
per, the keystream bytes are stored separately for decryption
in later stage as required. In future work, it should be possible
to analysing the trade-off between storing of random keys,
the security and the related space complexity.
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